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Abstract
The impact of performance funding on community college student outcomes is a
contested issue. Performance funding policies in most U.S. states involve too small
a proportion of funding to change college behavior. English further education
colleges are similar to U.S. community colleges. 1992 policy reforms in England
centralized policy control, and implemented a per-pupil funding formula; 10% of
all funding is based on student success but other components of the funding
formula pay colleges more money for enrolling disadvantaged students. This
research uses five years of student level data to test the impact of these policies.
Overall student success rates rose by 10% during the five-year period, with the
largest gains made by ethnic minorities, adult basic education students, and
students from disadvantaged neighborhoods. Although the English system depends
on regulatory agencies that do not exist in the U.S., the major assertion of this
research is that market-based funding policies—if properly designed—can promote
equity in educational achievement.
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community colleges
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Financiamiento por desempeño y por equidad: Éxito de los estudiantes en
escuelas de enseñanza superior inglesas.
Resumen
El impacto del financiamiento por desempeño en los resultados académicos de los
estudiantes universitarios es una cuestión muy disputada. Las políticas de
financiamiento por desempeño en la mayoría de los estados de EE.UU. son muy
escasas como para tener un peso sustantivo en la modificación de políticas
universitarias. Las escuelas de enseñanza superior inglesa son similares a las
universidades comunitarias de EE.UU. En 1992 se aprobaron reformas a las
políticas de control centralizado en Inglaterra y se comenzó a implementar una
fórmula de financiamiento por estudiante: 10% de todo el gasto se basaba en el
éxito del estudiante y otros componente otorgaban mas dinero a las universidades
por inscribir estudiantes de grupos desfavorecidos. Esta investigación utiliza cinco
años de información sobre los estudiantes para testear el impacto general de estas
políticas. El nivel de éxito general de los estudiantes aumento en un 10% durante
esos 5 años, con incrementos mayores en los estudiantes provenientes de minorías
étnicas, adultos estudiando su escolaridad básica, y estudiantes de barrios
desfavorecidos. Aun cuando el sistema inglés depende de agencias de control
desconocidas en el caso de EE.UU. la afirmación mas importante de este estudio es
que cuando están debidamente diseñadas, las políticas de financiamiento basadas en
principios de mercado pueden promover equidad en los logros educacionales.

Community colleges provide the pathway to a better career for students who lack the time,
financial resources, or educational background to attend a four-year institution, but the benefits of a
community college education are much greater for those who graduate from a degree or certificate
program than those who dropout (Grubb, 2002). Unfortunately, national graduation rates for
community college students are quite low. Six years after initial enrollment only 36% of community
college students received any degree or certificate. The results are worse for African American and
Hispanic students, 26% and 30%, respectively (U.S. Department of Education, 2002).
The picture is much brighter in England. English further education colleges—referred to as
further education colleges—are similar to U.S. community colleges—referred to as community
colleges—in that they are the primary education providers for low income adults. Success rates in
further education colleges—defined as whether or not a student successfully passes the qualification
they are enrolled in - increased by an impressive 18% from the 1997–98 to 2003–04 academic year
(Learning & Skills Council, 2004a, 2005). The gains were strongest for ethnic minorities, students
from “deprived” areas, Adult Basic Education (ABE) students, and students with learning
disabilities. 1 How did England achieve these results? This article focuses on the role of performance
funding and regulatory control, which are the components of its performance accountability system.

Deprived areas refer to geographic areas that receive high scores on a multidimensional index of
deprivation (Learning & Skills Council, 2002).
1
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Literature Review
Performance accountability has been identified as one solution to the problem of
unsatisfactory student outcomes in community colleges. Traditionally, accountability has focused on
fulfilling legal requirements, such as civil rights legislation, whereas the contemporary accountability
is focused on performance (Behn, 2001). Performance accountability refers to public policies which
attempt to align college goals with government goals. Three categories of performance
accountability are performance funding, performance budgeting, and performance reporting (Burke &
Minassians, 2003). In performance funding, a portion of funding is directly tied to performance on
key indicators through a funding formula. In performance budgeting, policymakers may consider
performance on key indicators when considering funding allocations. In performance reporting,
funding is not tied to performance, but public reporting of performance is theorized to create
incentives for improvement.
Recently U.S. state policy has moved away from performance funding in favor of
performance reporting. In 2003, 15 states had performance funding programs compared to 17 in
year 2000, 21 states had states performance budgeting programs compared to 28 in year 2000, and
46 states had performance reporting programs compared to 30 in 2000 (Burke & Minassians, 2003).
Some states are still experimenting with radical performance accountability programs. For example,
Colorado has instituted a statewide voucher program in its higher education system. Instead
allocating state funding to institutions, all students receive a flat-rate voucher which may be used
towards tuition at any college or university (Harbour, Davies, & Lewis, 2006).
There is a surprisingly small amount of research on the impact of performance
accountability programs on community college student outcomes. One nine-state study by
Dougherty and Hong (2005) found no relationship between the strength of performance
accountability system and community college student outcomes relating to remediation, retention,
graduation, transfer rates, and job placement. The study highlighted an important problem with
performance funding; in isolation performance funding rewards a very limited number of outcomes
to the detriments of other aspects of educational quality. Therefore, performance accountability can
lead to unintended consequences such as a decline in academic standards and creating a disincentive
to serve students who have lower likelihoods of success.
U.S. literature on the impact of performance accountability on student outcomes is limited
for several reasons. First, U.S. performance accountability policies generally involve too small a
proportion in overall funding to induce behavioral changes in colleges. Second, research, especially
cross-state studies, tends to oversimplify performance accountability systems. More attention should
be paid to individual mechanisms within the system, and how these mechanisms interact with each
other as a whole. Clearly, performance accountability policies can have unintended consequences,
but are these consequences unavoidable or can they be overcome by regulatory agencies and a welldesigned system?
This article provides insight into these issues by presenting results from a quantitative study
on the impact of performance accountability on student outcomes in further education colleges. The
funding system in England attempts to balance its strong funding component with additional
funding for colleges that serve “disadvantaged” students. 2 In addition, regulatory controls—

2 “Disadvantaged” students are defined as students coming from “backgrounds which have
disadvantaged them” (Learning & Skills Council, 2002), and are eligible for additional funding. These include

Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 14 No. 24

4

specifically college inspection and external assessment of student work—are designed to overcome
the perverse incentives created by performance funding.
The two-part research question is, first, how has the structure of funding policy and
regulatory control created incentives and mechanisms to increase student success? Second, what has
been the impact of performance accountability on student success over time? Because the impact of
performance funding is theorized result from the economic incentives it creates, the theoretical
framework of quasi-markets provides a useful lens. The analysis of English policy is followed by
statistical modeling using five years of student level data to ascertain the impact of policy on student
success. The final section discusses policy implications for the U.S.

Suitability of a U.S.—England Comparison
A basic understanding of further education colleges is prerequisite for a comparison of U.S.
and English policymaking. Further education colleges began as vocational training institutions and,
in a country obsessed with class, were held in low regard by the more genteel echelons of society
(Pratt, 2000). As educational opportunity reached a larger proportion of society, and as jobs
increasingly required a stronger foundation of academic knowledge, enrollment in further education
colleges skyrocketed and provision became a mix of academic and vocational instruction (Melville,
2000).
Today, more than 4 million students are enrolled in further education colleges (Learning &
Skills Council, 2004b), out of a population of 50 million people (National Statistics, 2005a). 3 By far
the largest set of further education institutions are the general further education colleges, with 3
million students enrolled in the 2003–04 academic year. 4 The analyses presented in this article focus
on general further education colleges, but will refer to them as further education colleges.
Like community colleges, further education colleges have a mission to serve disadvantaged
students. Both types of institution are the main education providers for low-income adults, students
seeking vocational training, and students who need ABE, such as literacy instruction. In both
countries, enrollment is highest for courses in business, information technology, and health care
(Learning & Skills Council, 2004b; National Center for Educational Statistics, 2004).
There are important differences as well. First, further education colleges typically offer
qualifications, with coursework ranging from a few weeks to several years, as opposed to degrees.
These qualifications resemble certificates offered by community colleges. For example, further
education colleges offer full-time, full-year qualifications in database management, which are
analogous to earning an advanced certificate in community colleges. Further education colleges
generally do not offer degree programs, such as the Associate’s degree, and they generally lack the
well-articulated transfer function that exists in Community colleges.
adult basic education students, those living in deprived areas, those with mental health problems or drug
dependencies, political asylum seekers, and others (Learning & Skills Council, 2002).
Further education colleges are one provider of English post-compulsory education, which ends at
age 16. The other types are universities, work-based learning providers (apprenticeships), and adult and
community learning centers.
3

Further education colleges can be divided into four types: sixth-form colleges, which educate 16- to
18-year-olds; specialist colleges, which focus on specific fields such as horticulture or performing arts; and
general further education colleges.
4
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Second, although 83% of students enrolled in further education are older than 18 (Learning
& Skills Council, 2004b), further education colleges also educate a large proportion of the country’s
16–18 year olds. Third, England has a strong national policymaking system, whereas in the U.S. each
state has an autonomous community college policymaking framework (Education Commission of
the States, 2000). Therefore, the policy implications from this English case-study relate to U.S. state
policymaking, not federal policymaking.

Theoretical Framework
Quasi-markets provide a useful framework for understanding funding and regulatory control
policies in England. Johnson (1999) states that the four aspects of social services are strategy,
funding, regulation, and provision. Generally, quasi-markets involve the separation of state finance
from state provision, alongside the introduction of competition in the provision of services
(Johnson, 1999; Walsh, 1995). Voucher systems in education are one example; funding follows
students in their choice of schools, competition to attract students leads to increases efficiency (in
theory), and institutions failing to attract enough students are forced to exit the market.
Market based policies can be used to align the incentives of providers with the overall goals
of central government. The principal-agent relationship plays a central role here: the principal
(central government) pays the agent (individual colleges) to perform pre-specified services (Bartlett,
Roberts, & Le Grand, 1998a). The principal must decide on the set of performance indicators to
assess performance. Performance funding is generally resisted by colleges because it reduces budget
stability, it undermines autonomy, and because the performance indicators chosen are often too
simplistic to be valid measures of performance at college level.
Analyzing the incentives created by principal-agent funding arrangements is central to the
analysis of funding policy. The smaller the amount of performance funding and the greater the
number of performance indicators this funding is divided by, the less incentive colleges have to
improve their performance on these indicators. The ineffectiveness of performance funding in many
U.S. states can be partially attributed to having too small an amount of funding tied to too many
indicators (Burke & Minassians, 2003).
Creating incentives for one kind of behavior can have unintended side effects. When
performance is based on a single indicator—for example student success—providers have an
incentive to focus their energy on that indicator, potentially at the expense of other activities that
may be important to provision. Funding solely on the basis of student success would create strong
incentives to lower academic standards. Additionally, performance funding for student success tends
to exacerbate educational inequalities because colleges serving disadvantaged populations are likely
to receive less performance funding than colleges serving affluent populations. Allocating additional
funding for colleges that serve disadvantaged populations can help counterbalance this unintended
side effect.
Monitoring/regulation costs are the amount spent to ensure that agents (colleges) are acting
in the interest of the principal (government). Monitoring costs decrease when the incentives of the
agent are aligned with the incentives of the principal, or when both parties can agree on a shared
mission. Similarly, when trust between the principal and agent increases, monitoring costs decrease.
Monitoring costs increase when performance is difficult to measure and involves many outcomes.
Walsh (1995) describes a specific quasi-market form in which a central organization has
control of overall strategy, and ultimate control of funding while semi-autonomous regulatory
agencies are responsible for the different aspects of regulation. Monitoring costs are the costs
incurred by these regulatory agencies. The idea is that the central organization “steers” but does not
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“row” (Bartlett, Roberts, & Le Grand, 1998b). 1992 policy reforms in England created a similar
policymaking system for further education colleges. The Department for Education and Skills
(DfES) retained control of overall strategy; separate agencies, accountable to the DfES, became
responsible for funding, inspection, and external assessment of student grades. The goal of these
agencies was to ensure that agents (the colleges) act in the interest of the principal, the DfES.

Funding Policy and Regulatory Control in England
Overview of Policy Reform in English Further Education
Before 1992, funding and policymaking for further education colleges was very similar to the
current system used by California community colleges (Jaquette, 2005); colleges were funded
through a combination of local property taxes and block grants from the national government to
local education districts. These districts were responsible for hiring and firing, curriculum design,
financial administration, and allocation of funds to individual colleges (McLure, 2000).
In 1992 there were dramatic reforms in English further education. National legislation
moved policymaking control from the local districts to the central government. Centralized
regulatory agencies were created to regulate the different aspects of provision, such as funding,
inspection, external assessment of student grades, etc. As a part of this effort, the new funding
agency devised a performance-based per-pupil funding formula. Before this reform, block grant
funding was given to local districts. After the reform, funding followed individual students to the
college they decided to attend, essentially creating a national voucher system. The funding formula
pays institutions additional funding for enrolling disadvantaged students and, currently, 10% of total
funding depends on student success (Learning & Skills Council, 2002). The government created a
centralized data system to track the progress of all students in the country and to allocate formula
funding to institutions based on individual student progress. This data system, called the
Individualized Learner Record, was the source of quantitative data used in this study.
After the reform, each college became responsible for its own financial administration and
solvency. These responsibilities had previously been the domain of local education authorities.
Additionally, within each college, the lay board of governors was given increased oversight power of
school finances and employment of senior management. Collectively, the 1992 reforms are
commonly referred to as Incorporation Reform because they forced colleges to behave more like
private corporations.
The passage of Incorporation Reform legislation was quickly followed by a high-profile
report entitled Unfinished Business which detailed the low retention and success rates under the
prior further education funding and control framework (Audit Commission & Office for Standards
in Education, 1993). The evidence from Unfinished Business was instrumental in securing the
support of colleges during the implementation of the strong external accountability policies created
in the Incorporation legislation (Davies & Rudden, 2000).
The Per-Pupil Funding Formula
This section utilizes the quasi-market framework to analyze Incorporation funding policies
and regulatory agencies created incentives and mechanisms to increase student success rates. Table 1

Funding for Performance and Equity

7

below shows the total number of full time equivalent students (FTES) in all of English further
education, as well as total funding, and average funding per FTES student. 5 Total funding for
further education has risen consistently since the 1999–00 academic year, while average funding per
student peaked in the 2001–02 academic year.
Table 1
Full-time Equivalent Students (FTES) and Funding in Further Education Colleges, 1994–95—
2003–04
Year
FTES students Total funding ($millions) Average funding per FTES ($)
1994–95
914,000
5,326
5,827
1995–96
989,000
5,372
5,432
1996–97
1,027,000
5,425
5,282
1997–98
1,020,000
5,289
5,186
1998–99
1,004,000
5,093
5,072
1999–00
977,000
5,302
5,427
2000–01
953,000
5,514
5,786
2001–02
970,000
6,078
6,266
2002–03
1,051,000
6,483
6,169
2003–04
1,117,000
6,899
6,176
Funding columns use constant 2002 £ converted using average 2002 exchange rate.
Source: National Statistics (2005b).
The per-pupil funding formula is the tool by which this funding is allocated from the central
government to individual colleges. The formula was first implemented in the 1993–94 academic year
(McLure, 2000). The funding formula would more precisely be called a per-qualification funding
formula because colleges are paid on the basis of each qualification a student undertakes. However,
throughout the paper I will refer to the per-pupil funding formula to stress the fact that funding
follows each student. The amount calculated in the formula is intended to cover teaching as well as
fixed costs such as building and equipment. To increase stability, colleges are guaranteed at least
90% of previous year’s funding (Learning & Skills Council, 2002).
Analysis of the funding formula is based on funding guidance documents sent from the
central funding agency to individual colleges from 1998–2003 (Further Education Funding Council,
1999b, 2000, 2001; Learning & Skills Council, 2002). Although there have been incremental changes
from year to year, the formula remained largely the same until the 2002–03 academic year when the
policy reforms of Blair’s Labour government took effect (Jaquette, 2005). Due to space limitations
this article focuses on the most recent funding formula and not on how funding policy changed over
time. 6 The 2002–03 funding formula is presented in equation (1). Each of its components is
explained in turn.

These funding amounts differ from funding calculations shown later in the paper, because later
calculations are based on a subset of adult students, while Table 1 is based on all students in further education
colleges, including 16–19 year old students.
5

6

Detailed analyses of how the formula changed over time appear in Jaquette (2005).

8
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2002–03 Funding Formula

(1)

£ per qualification = [ (Base Rate - Achievement Funding) x Programme Weighting Factor x
Disadvantage Uplift x London Weighting Factor] - Tuition + Additional Learning Support
Base Rate = Base funding for each qualification
Achievement Funding = Deduction valued at 10% of the base rate if the student fails
Programme Weighting Factor = Higher weighting for more costly programs. (A=1, B= 1.12, C=
1.3, D=1.6, E= 1.72, Adult Basic Education = 1.4)
Disadvantage Uplift = Additional funding to reflect that some students require more resources
than others (Postcode disadvantage uplift = 1.1 (on average), Homeless students disadvantage uplift
= 1.12, All others = 1.1)
London Weighting Factor = Additional funding to account for higher cost of provision in
London (Central London = 1.18, Inner London = 1.12, Outer London = 1.06).
Tuition = 25% of Base Rate. If the student is not eligible for tuition remission, then government
funding is reduced by 25% of the base rate, and the student pays tuition directly to the college. If the
student is eligible for tuition remission, than the government does not subtract tuition from college
funding.
Additional Learning Support = Additional funding for students with special learning needs. Value
depends on needs of individual student.
Source: Learning & Skills Council (2002).
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Base rate. The base-rate is the core amount of funding for each qualification. This amount is
predominantly determined by the number of guided learning hours (instructional hours) for that
qualification. 7 90% of base-rate funding is dependent on retention and 10% is dependent on student
success. The academic year is divided into three funding periods and an institution receives retention
funding for a qualification only if the student is present on the census date for that period. For
example, imagine a student enrolled in a qualification that begins in September and ends in July. If
that student drops out on December 15th (which is after the first census date but before the second
census date) then the institution only receives 30% of base rate funding. Utilizing the quasi-market
framework, the funding formula forces these public providers to focus their resources on student
retention and achievement as opposed to initial enrollment.
Achievement funding. Student success is valued at 10% of base-rate funding. For example, in
2002–03 a qualification listed as having 440 guided learning hours had a base rate of £1,594
(Learning & Skills Council, 2002). If the student successfully completes the qualification, then the
institution receives the full £1,594 base-rate funding. If the student is present throughout the
qualification, but does not pass examination, then the institution receives 90% of base-rate funding
[(£1,594 – 10%*£1,594 = £1435)]. Before the 2002–03 academic year achievement funding fell into
three categories: qualifications deemed relevant to the needs of the economy received achievement
funding equivalent to 7% of total funding, other qualifications received 5% achievement funding,
and certain qualifications (such as those not externally assessed) received no achievement funding
(Further Education Funding Council, 1999b) (Further Education Funding Council, 2000, 2001).
Beginning in the 2002–03 academic year all qualifications received 10% achievement funding. This
represents a shift in funding emphasis toward student success and, in theory, gives colleges a
stronger financial incentive to ensure their students are successful. 8
Program weighting factor (PWF). Program weighting factors are another component of the
funding formula in equation (1) above. These weighting factors give higher funding for provision
that is deemed more costly. Table 2 below shows the different weighting factors. Providing medical
technician training, for example, is more costly than teaching history and thus funding for students
enrolled in these qualifications has a higher weighting factor.
The goal of weighting factors is to eliminate the disincentive against providing costly
provision. The funding formula presented in equation (1) shows that higher weighting factors are
multiplied through achievement funding, which can lead to dramatic increases in total funding
(Jaquette, 2005). Prior to the 2002–03 this was not the case; two qualifications with different
weighting factors but the same instructional hours received the same achievement funding.
Therefore, starting in 2002–03 institutions received a greater financial incentive increase success
rates for qualifications that had higher weighting factors.
Base-rate funding for certain qualifications is listed explicitly as opposed to being determined by the
number of guided learning hours. However, these amounts of base-rate funding for these listed courses do
not differ greatly from the amount of funding they would receive had base-rate funding been determined by
guided learning hours.
7

8 Most qualifications consist of only a single component, but colleges can receive partial achievement
funding when a single qualification has multiple components. For example, if a student enrolled in an
Advanced Vocational Certificate of Education—one of England’s longer qualifications—successfully
completes three out of the five modules, the college would receive three-fifths of the achievement funding. In
the 2002–03 academic year, just 1.5% of the qualifications received partial achievement funding. An
analogous program in the United States would pay achievement funding for each individual course a student
successfully completed.
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Table 2.
Program Weighting Factors
Factor
Weight Example
A
1
Accounting, history, economics, psychology
B
1.12
Information technology, teacher training, dance,
pharmacology, chemistry
C
1.3
Hair styling, photography, catering, interior design, metallurgy
D
1.6
Music technology, food preparation, animal care, engineering
E
1.72
Gardening, fish production
Adult Basic Education
1.4
Adult literacy, numeracy
(ABE)
Source: Learning & Skills Council (2002).
Table 2 shows that ABE qualifications receive higher program weighting. This policy is part
of the Skills for Life initiative, which is a massive effort to increase adult literacy and numeracy
(Department for Education and Employment, 2001). The higher weighting factor for ABE
contributes to the initiative by increasing the financial incentive for colleges to serve these students. 9
Disadvantage uplift. Performance funding was simultaneously implemented with several
policy efforts to increase enrollment of low-income students (Kennedy, 1997). The disadvantage
uplift is one of these policies. It pays institutions premium funding for enrolling disadvantaged
students. The stated goal of disadvantage uplift funding in England is “to ensure that certain learners
attract a funding enhancement, which reflects their relative disadvantage and the expected additional
costs incurred by institutions in attracting and retaining such learners” (Learning & Skills Council,
2002, p. 9).
The funding formula presented in equation (1) shows that disadvantage uplift funding is
multiplied through achievement funding. This creates a financial incentive to increase success rates
for disadvantaged students. The disadvantage uplift was introduced in the 1998–99 academic year. It
was initially applied to homeless students and students living in deprived postcodes (Kennedy,
1997). Starting in the 1999–00 academic year the uplift was extended to adult basic skills students,
students receiving means-tested benefits, those with mental health problems and drug dependencies,
asylum seekers, refugees, ex-offenders, and others (Further Education Funding Council, 1999a)
(Further Education Funding Council, 2000). Table 3 below shows that over time the average
monetary value of the uplift increased as did the percentage of students receiving the uplift.

Adult basic education students have been defined as those who are “undertaking programmes
where the primary learning goal is adult basic education or English for speakers of other languages” (Learning
& Skills Council, 2002). ABE qualifications refers to coursework in literacy, numeracy, access to further
education, courses for students with learning disabilities, and other basic education. Therefore, ABE students
are those whose primary learning goal is ABE/ESOL, but they may take non-ABE qualifications in addition
to ABE qualifications.
9
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Table 3
Disadvantage Uplift Mechanisms and Consequences, 1998–99—2002–03
Effects
1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03
Value of disadvantage uplift by student type a
Postcode disadvantage uplift (average
1.06
1.06
1.08
1.1
1.1
value)
Homeless and residential care
1.09
1.09
1.12
1.12
1.12
disadvantage uplift
All othersa
NA
1.06
1.08
1.1
1.1
b
Percentage of students receiving disadvantage uplift by student type
Postcode disadvantage uplift
29.2
26.9
26.7
26.1
29.1
Any disadvantage uplift (including
29.2
37.0
38.8
39.1
41.7
postcode)
Source: Jaquette (2005).
a
The following groups of students became qualified for a disadvantage uplift beginning in the 1999–
00 academic year: adult basic skills students, those receiving means-tested benefits, those with
mental health problems, those recovering from alcohol or drug dependencies, political asylum
seekers, political refugees, ex-convicts, those whose statutory education has been interrupted, those
in or who have recently left mental or physical healthcare, those taking care of children/relatives as a
full-time job.
b
The percentage of students receiving a disadvantage uplift was calculated using a sub-sample of the
further education population. This sub-sample is defined in the quantitative modeling section to
follow.
Additional learning support. Additional learning support (ALS)—another component of the
funding formula—is funding for special support in addition to what is normally provided in a
standard learning program (Further Education Funding Council, 2000). ALS funding facilitates the
employment of specialist staff including additional teachers to reduce class size (used especially in
basic skills), personal care assistants, mobility assistants, readers, note-takers, and educational
psychologists (Further Education Funding Council, 2001). The most common types of students
utilizing ALS were basic skills students and those with sensory impairment, dyslexia, learning
difficulties, or physical impairment (Faraday, Fletcher, & Gidney, 2000).
ALS has existed since 1993. Two evaluations of ALS have stated that the program is very
popular amongst providers because there is no limit to the amount of ALS funding an institution
may receive for serving a single student and because ALS is funded on an uncapped, per-pupil basis
by the central funding agency rather than by operating revenue of individual colleges (Faraday &
Fletcher, 2003; Faraday et al., 2000). If, instead, each college was given a lump sum of ALS funding
for all students, this could create a disincentive for enrolling students with costly support needs.
In the 2002–03 academic year 9.3% of the population analyzed in this study received
additional learning support. The average amount of ALS funding for each qualification receiving
ALS (note that a single student can be enrolled in more than one qualification) was equivalent to
$1080 using a January 2003 exchange rate (Jaquette, 2005). Logistic regression modeling, presented
below, shows that the presence of ALS had a significant positive effect on the likelihood of student
success, especially for disabled students and basic skills students (Jaquette, 2005).
Tuition remission. Tuition fees are the final component of the funding formula. Generally,
students are expected to pay their colleges a tuition fee equal to 25% of the national base rate for
their qualification. Referring to the funding formula above, any tuition fees paid to the institution by
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the student is deducted from the amount the central funding agency pays to the college. However,
many students are eligible for tuition remission. If the student is eligible for tuition remission, the
central funding agency does not deduct the tuition fee from the amount it pays the college. In the
five years of data analyzed in this study, 29% of students paid full tuition fees. The rest were either
eligible for tuition remission or the individual college decided to reduce or waive tuition costs as part
of their internal policy. In this latter case, the institution does not receive tuition fees from either the
student or the central funding agency.
Regulating Further Education
The potential unintended consequences of performance funding include lowering academic
standards, restricting open access, and focusing resources only on the measurable outcomes which
are subject to performance funding. Performance funding policies implemented in isolation of
countervailing policies and institutions are more likely to exhibit these unintended consequences.
In England several semi-autonomous government agencies help reduce these unintended
side-effects and also put pressure on institutions to improve performance. This section discusses
three important regulatory agencies in English further education, all of which are funded by and
accountable to the Department for Education and Skills (DfES).
The Learning and Skills Council. The Learning and Skills Council (LSC) is in charge of
funding and planning further education, which includes administering the funding formula described
above. The LSC was created under the Labour Government by the Learning and Skills Act of 2000
(Department for Education and Employment, 1999). The predecessor to the LSC was the Further
Education Funding Council (FEFC), which was created by the Conservative government in the
wake of 1992 Incorporation Reform. There are important differences between these two
organizations. First, while FEFC was responsible only for further education, the LSC expanded its
policymaking remit to include work-based learning providers and adult community education
learning providers as well. Second, while FEFC was responsible for inspection, LSC lost this
inspection responsibility because the DfES wanted an arms-length relationship between funding and
inspection.
Third, under the FEFC enrollment growth was encouraged by market mechanisms. The
entry funding element of the FEFC funding formula created a “grow or die” mentality for colleges
leading to dubious recruitment practices (Ball, Maguire, & Macrae, 2000; Rospigliosi, 2000). When
the Labour government came to power in 1997 market incentives for growth were reduced. The
LSC funding formula introduced in 2002–03 eliminated entry funding and LSC satellite offices took
a stronger role in planning enrollment growth at the local level. This exemplifies the shift away from
free market policies and towards centralized planning. Therefore, LSC has a planning remit that the
FEFC lacked.
Inspection agencies. Inspection is seen by many to be the most influential regulatory force in
English further education (G. Pine, personal communication, August 5, 2005). The Adult Learning
Inspectorate and the Office for Standards in Education are jointly responsible for inspecting
colleges. Inspection of colleges is guided by seven core questions, three of which relate directly to
student success. Each college was inspected once between April 2001 and summer 2005 (Office for
Standards in Education & Adult Learning Inspectorate, 2001).
Inspection teams grade soft outcomes and processes to guard against the unintended
consequence of colleges focusing resources only on performance funding measures. These include
quality of instruction, student engagement, quality of their guidance counseling and tutoring services,
fulfillment of equal-opportunity responsibilities, etc (Learning & Skills Development Agency, 2003;
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Office for Standards in Education, 2002) Additionally, inspection teams review a sample of
individual learning plans which colleges are required to create for each student (Learning & Skills
Development Agency, 2003).
Inspections have sharp teeth. Poor inspection grades for a particular program area can lead
to a freeze in enrolment, the closing of that program area, and even closure of the institution. When
college programs or services are deemed in need of improvement, they must develop action plans
and report on their progress (Office for Standards in Education, 2002).
Inspection is also a strategic mechanism used to increase student success. High or improving
success rates are prerequisite for good inspection grades. Results of inspections are posted on the
Office for Standards in Education website. 10 This public report on performance creates an incentive
for institutions to increase success rates in order to maximize institutional prestige. Additionally,
several college principals have been fired by their local board of governors because of poor
inspection results, which are largely dependent on improving success rates (G. Pine, personal
communication, August 5, 2005).
Qualifications and Curriculum Authority. The Qualifications and Curriculum Authority is a
regulatory agency that “maintains and develops the national curriculum… and accredits [externally
assesses] and monitors qualifications in colleges and at work” (Qualifications and Curriculum
Authority, 2005). 11 This study is primarily concerned with the external assessment role; exams and
projects are sent to third-party graders who determine whether students pass the qualification and
the grade that students receive. The guiding principle behind external assessment is that when
institutions face strong pressure to increase student success, they should not determine what
constitutes success. In the absence of external assessment colleges would have a strong incentive to
lower academic standards in order to increase success rates. Therefore, external assessment helps
ensure that gains in student success rates are not due to declining academic standards.
Summary
This section sought to address the first research question: how has the structure of funding
policy and regulatory control created incentives and mechanisms to increase student success?
Analysis of the per-pupil funding formula showed that institutions had a strong financial incentive to
ensure their students were successful. In absence of other measures this could lead some colleges to
restrict enrollment to students that had a high likelihood of success. However, the funding formula
contained other components—specifically the disadvantage uplift and additional learning support—
which mediated against such enrollment restriction. Regulatory agencies were also shown to play a
key role in reducing unintended consequences and catalyzing improvements in student success. The
Department of Education and Skills controls the strategic goals of these agencies to ensure they
compliment one another. In the next section I analyze five years of student level data to see whether
funding policy and regulatory control was actually successful in raising student success rates.
This website has inspection reports for all FE colleges available at
http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/reports/index.cfm?fuseaction=listColleges&type=fecollege.
10

In England the process of using third-party graders to assess student work is external
accreditation. In this article I have replaced the term external accreditation with external assessment. The
rationale for this action is to reduce confusion for readers because in the U.S. the term accreditation refers to
peer-evaluation of entire institutions, as opposed to external assessment of student work.
11
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Descriptive Statistics and Modeling
This section uses five years of student level administrative data to gain insight on the second
research question: What has been the impact of funding and regulatory control on student success?
A description of the data will be followed by analysis of descriptive statistics and regression
modeling. Unfortunately, these analyses using data from 1998–99 to 2002–03 cannot fully answer
the second research question because the data years analyzed postdate the dramatic policy reforms
implemented beginning in 1993. Additionally, incremental changes in funding policy and regulation
have often been implemented simultaneously with changes in the national curriculum, changes in
teacher training, etc. which lie outside the already wide scope of this research. However, these are
shortcomings which plague most analyses that are not experimental in nature.
There is another reason to be cautious results which attempt to isolate the effect of specific
funding policies on student success; these policies are intended to work in concert rather than
isolation from one another. Disadvantage uplift funding and additional learning support funding are
intended to offset the additional financial burden of helping disadvantaged students become
successful. The grading system used by the inspection regime is intended to give colleges the
incentive to focus resources on increasing student success. Indeed, a major criticism of performance
accountability efforts in U.S. states is that they tend to be tacked on to existing systems without
thought to how policies reinforce or conflict with one another. Therefore, when thinking about
what drives trends in success rates, readers are encouraged to think holistically about the incentives
and checks and balances created by the entire funding and regulatory system.
Data and Sample
The following analyses are based on student level administrative data from 1998–99 to
2002–03 academic years for the entire population of further education students. The data have never
before been used in academic research. Further education reform in 1992 mandated that all colleges
return data for all students. The resulting dataset is called the Individualized Learner Record (ILR),
which is similar to student data tracking systems which exist in most U.S. states. The data is
qualification level data rather than student level data because an individual enrolled in three
qualifications would have three observations in the ILR.
Several additional datasets were merged with the ILR. First, institution level data was
retrieved from an LSC administrative dataset. Secondly, ILR data was merged with data from the
Learning Aim Database 12 to get qualification level variables, including the program weighting factor.
Third, data on local area population density and local area educational attainment were retrieved
from the 2001 UK census. Finally, the English Indices of Deprivation 2004 were merged to the ILR
by student postcode. These indices combine seven measures of deprivation (income deprivation,

The Learning Aim Database provides information on qualifications and learning aims for
institutions. The software provided by the Learning Aim Database is used by colleges to determine how
much funding they will receive for each qualification. The Learning Aim Database Website is
http://providers.lsc.gov.uk/lad/default.asp
12
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crime deprivation, housing deprivation) into a single index, which shows how deprived a local area
is. 13
Variables were chosen for the following analysis based on a literature review of factors that
influence adult student success rates (Alfonso, Bailey, & Scott, 2005; Bailey et al., 2004; Davies,
2001; Davies & Rudden, 2000; Grubb & Lazerson, 2004; Martinez, 2001; St. John, 1999). These
factors were divided into individual demographic determinants (such as ethnicity, gender),
qualification level determinants (such as difficulty level, mode of instruction), institution level
characteristics (such as number of students, and population density of college geographic area), and,
finally, funding determinants (Jaquette, 2005). These funding determinants were based on the above
analysis of funding policy, and are the main determinants of interest. Unfortunately, key variables
such as previous educational attainment, parental income, and parental education were not present
in the ILR.
The population was restricted to one that would be most comparable to American
community colleges. The sample kept students from General Further Education Colleges and
Tertiary Colleges, dropping sixth-form colleges (which educate 16–18 year olds), specialist colleges
(for example horticulture, or drama colleges), external providers, and work-based learning providers
(apprenticeships). This analysis only retained students who were 19 or older at the beginning of the
academic year. Because the analysis of funding policy focused on the funding policies under the
FEFC/LSC, qualifications not funded by FEFC/LSC were dropped. Qualifications in franchised
provision were dropped in order to focus on a more homogenous group of providers. 14 Additionally
the sample only kept students on courses of 20 or more guided learning hours. The rationale was to
exclude “taster courses” and other courses that would be expected to have high success rates due to
their short duration.
The data was further limited to qualifications where student success was known.
Observations were deleted if the qualification was continuing to the next academic year, if the exam
results were unknown, or if the students were partially successful. To illustrate, in the 2002–03 ILR
data student success was known for 86.5% of qualifications. This 86.5% would be kept in the
sample. Of the remaining 13.5%, 1.5% had partial achievement, 2.5% exam not taken/result not
known, and 9.5% qualification continuing to the next academic year. There was right censoring, but
not left censoring; a student who started a two-year course in year X-1 would be dropped from the
data in year X-1, but would appear in year X when their outcome was known. This ensures that
there is no duplication of student qualifications from one year to the next.
Observations in the analysis dataset have three possible outcomes: first, they withdrew from
the course; second, they were present throughout the duration of the qualification (this is called
retention), but failed to pass examination; third, they were present throughout the qualification, and
The 2004 Indices of Deprivation were commissioned by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
to the Social Disadvantage Research Centre at the Department of Social Policy and Social Work at Oxford
University. The Indices of Deprivation are based on the idea that distinct measures of deprivation can be
measured at the output area level and aggregated into an index that measures the total amount of deprivation
experienced by individuals living in a particular super output area. Each super output area has about 1,500
people. The seven domains of deprivation are: income deprivation; employment deprivation; health and
disability deprivation; education, skills and training deprivation; barriers to housing and services, living
environment deprivation, and crime deprivation. These indices are different from the ones which are used to
determine whether students receive a postcode disadvantage uplift.
13

Franchised provision is when an institution contracts an external provider to provide instruction
on behalf of the institution.
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they successfully passed examination. The analyses presented here only consider the binary outcome
called success, where 0 = withdrawn or failed examination, 1 = passed examination. Analyses of
student retention can be found in Jaquette (2005) .
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 on the next page shows success rates for the overall population and for sub-groups
from the 1998–99 to 2002–03 academic year. In the appendix, Table A-1 shows the corresponding
sample sizes. Overall success rates increased by 10% over this time period and the gains were
distributed fairly equally over time, growing by 2.8%, 2.3%, 2.2% and 2.7% in each respective year.
Subgroup analysis shows which groups made the strongest gains. The local level of
deprivation is analyzed first. A higher deprivation score means that the student comes from a more
deprived postcode. Looking down the columns, less deprived areas are always associated with higher
success rates, but looking across the rows the biggest gains over time were made by students in
highly deprived areas. This result suggests that the achievement gap between affluent and deprived
areas is decreasing over time.
Looking next at ethnicity, 2002–03 non-whites made up 26% of the sample as compared to
22% in 1998–99. 15 White and Indian students generally have the highest success rates. The overall
picture is that gains were strong for all ethnic groups, with the white vs. non-white achievement gap
closing over time, from 7% in 1998–99 to 5% in 2002–03. 16 It is important to note that non-whites
are making these gains despite residing in more highly deprived areas. For example, in this study
Bangladeshis had the highest average level of deprivation and their success rates increased by 20%.
The findings for deprivation and ethnicity are important considering research in the United States,
which indicates ethnic minorities and deprived students persistently have low and stagnant success
rates (Bailey et al., 2004).
Looking next at gender, women generally have higher success rates than men. However,
success rates for women have increased by 9%, while success rates for men have increased by 12%.
Looking next at age, older students have higher success rates and stronger gains over time than
younger students.
The next set of variables focus on the type of qualification a student enrolls in (a single
student can enroll in multiple qualifications). The variable qualification level is a measure of course
difficulty as determined by the Qualification and Curriculum Authority. 17 The gains are strongest for
“other” and level 1, which are generally low level qualifications. 18

15

Author’s calculation.

16

Author’s calculation.

Note that we cannot make a valid comparison to the 2002–03 data because the level assigned to
some courses was changed as part of the transition towards a national qualification framework.
17

Other qualification variables, such as area of learning (i.e. science, business, construction, etc) and
qualification type (i.e. A-level, NVQ, GNVQ, etc) are included in Jaquette (2005). Critics have state that the
rise in success rates is due to declining rigor in new curriculum. Jaquette (2005) devotes considerable attention
to this assertion but finds that this is not the case.
18
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Table 4
Qualification Success Rates, 1998–99 to 2002–03
Population
1998–99 1999–00
Overall
56.9
59.7
Deprivation Index
Deprivation LT 10
60.9
62.6
Deprivation 10-<20
59.5
61.8
Deprivation 20-<30
56.6
59.4
Deprivation 35-<50
52.9
56.8
Deprivation 50+
49.4
54.2
Ethnicity
Bangladeshi
46.6
51.5
Black-African
44.4
51.8
Black-Caribbean
46.3
50.3
Black-Other
45.2
48.3
Chinese
52.2
56.4
Indian
55.5
59.0
Pakistani
48.9
52.0
White
58.4
61.1
Asian-Other
51.3
55.7
Gender
Male
53.0
56.4
Female
59.3
61.7
Age
Age 19–25
52.1
54.7
Age 26–34
56.8
59.9
Age 35–44
60.8
63.4
Age 45–54
59.7
62.1
Age 55+
54.8
57.9
Disabled
56.6
62.1
a
Qualification level
Entry & level 1
55.7
59.1
Level 2
55.2
58.1
Level 3
55.1
57.8
Level 4 or Higher
54.3
50.2
Other
61.9
68.9
External assessment
Not externally assessed
60.0
65.9
Externally assessed
56.1
59.0
Qualification duration
LT 24 Weeks
66.0
67.0
24-<48 Weeks
53.8
57.6
48+ Weeks
46.6
47.8
Mode of attendance
Full-time, full-year
56.7
59.9
Full-time, part-year
66.2
69.6
Part-time
56.3
58.9

2000–01
62.0

2001–02
64.2

2002–03
66.9

64.4
63.9
61.7
59.4
57.6

66.8
65.9
63.7
61.5
60.1

69.4
68.7
66.7
64.5
62.9

57.2
53.7
53.1
51.7
59.5
60.4
50.3
63.0
58.8

61.1
56.9
56.3
55.2
63.1
64.5
58.1
65.7
61.4

67.0
59.5
57.5
56.8
67.9
68.3
60.8
68.3
62.3

59.4
63.5

61.8
65.7

64.6
68.4

55.4
62.4
65.9
65.2
61.5
63.3

57.1
64.6
67.7
67.2
65.5
65.5

60.2
66.3
69.6
70.5
70.9
70.1

60.7
59.7
60.6
51.3
71.7

64.0
61.3
62.6
54.7
71.7

68.5
62.6
64.5
60.3
76.9

71.0
60.8

74.3
62.0

75.9
63.9

70.2
58.1
52.0

73.6
59.5
50.4

74.9
62.1
56.5

57.2
71.9
62.3

58.0
74.8
64.6

62.2
75.5
67.3
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Population
1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03
Open/distance learning
44.1
47.8
50.8
47.3
52.0
Funding Determinants
Receive access funding
57.2
59.1
65.0
Postcode disadvantage uplift
52.0
55.6
58.4
60.4
63.7
On benefit
50.1
53.1
55.2
58.2
60.3
ABE student
55.8
64.4
70.0
73.1
72.8
Asylum seeker
47.8
51.1
59.1
58.4
57.5
Additional Learning Support
61.4
65.6
66.3
69.3
73.8
N
1,509,393 1,687,464 1,692,394 1,646,138 1,771,842
a
Percentages for 2002–03 not comparable to previous years due to change in definitions.
External assessment has special theoretical importance to this research; when institutions
face such strong pressure to increase success rates, the cheapest solution is to institute more lenient
grading policies. However, colleges do not have this power when standards are controlled by the
national curriculum authority and student success rates are determined by external graders.
Generally, about 80% of qualifications analyzed in this study were externally assessed. Over the five
year period success rate gains for non-externally assessed qualifications were 16% compared to 8%
for externally assessed qualifications. Therefore, non-externally assessed qualifications have higher
success rates are higher and make stronger gains over time, but are not the driving force in overall
success rate gains because they represent a minority of the population.
The final set of variables in table 4 focuses on qualifications which were subject to additional
funding initiatives. Most of these funding initiatives—whether they were aimed at the college or
directly to the student—focused on students who historically have had low success rates. Access
Funding is given directly to students who are low income or in receipt of means tested benefit and
can be used to offset the childcare costs, transportation costs, books and equipment, and
examination fees. In theory, such programs help adult students balance work, family obligations, and
education (Grubb & Lazerson, 2004). Access funding was not implemented nationally until the
2000–01 academic year. Success rates for students receiving access funding grew 8% over the three
years of data. 19
The postcode disadvantage uplift is a disadvantage uplift for students who live in a deprived
postcode. Between the academic years 1998–99 and 2002–03 success rates for students receiving a
disadvantage-postcode uplift increased by 11.7% compared to 10% for the national average. This
finding may be especially important for policymakers. Research on Community colleges has found it
is difficult to increase success rates for disadvantaged students (Bailey, Calcagno, Jenkins, Kienzl, &
Leinbach, 2005; Grubb & Lazerson, 2004). Further education colleges, however, are given a dual
financial incentive to serve these students and ensure that they are successful. The value of the
disadvantage uplift increased from an average of 6% of total funding in 1998–99 to 8% in 2000–01
to 10% in 2002–03. Furthermore, as explained in the previous section, the total value uplift funding
is increased when students are successful.

In analysis restricted to students receiving means tested benefits, those receiving access funding
had higher success rates than those not receiving access funding (Jaquette, 2005). Therefore, when restricting
analysis to students which are—theoretically—eligible for access funding, those that actually receive access
funding have higher success rates.
19

Funding for Performance and Equity

19

Students receiving means tested benefits and political asylum seekers have been eligible for
fee remission—a funding policy directed at the student—in all years studied. Beginning in 1998–99
both groups began receiving disadvantage uplift funding at 6% of total funding. This amount rose to
8% in 2000–01, and to 10% in 2002–03. Therefore, these students receive direct financial support
(no-tuition), and in addition institutions are paid more money for serving these students. Although
the success rates remain below the national average, both groups showed gains of 10% which is
significant considering the special challenges facing these disadvantaged students.
ABE students have benefited from a number of financial incentives aimed at both students
and providers. To summarize, they received tuition remission since 1998–99, 20 beginning in 1999–00
they became eligible for a disadvantaged uplift, and beginning in 2002–03 ABE qualifications
received a higher program weighting. ABE students were also eligible to receive additional learning
support. Over the five years studied success rates for ABE students increased by 17%.
Finally, students receiving Additional Learning Support (ALS) have much higher success
rates than those not receiving ALS. ALS students also make stronger gains over time. Further
subgroup analysis shows that this result is partly explained by the fact that ALS students are more
likely to be enrolled in non-externally assessed qualifications (Jaquette, 2005). However, even after
controlling for external assessment, ALS is strongly associated with higher success rates as shown in
the following regression results.
Simulating the funding formula. The per-pupil funding formula was simulated by combining
student level data from the Individualized Learner Record with the rules from funding policy
documents (Further Education Funding Council, 1999b, 2000, 2001; Learning & Skills Council,
2002). 21 Figure 1 below shows funding per instructional hour for select student groups from 1998–
99 to 2002–03 using constant 2002 £ converted using average 2002 exchange rate. Because this
research focused on incentives created by funding policy, Figure 1 shows how much money
institutions receive for each student if the student is successful.
Figure 1 yields several important results. First, average funding for all students rose steadily
from $8.7 per instructional hour in the 1998–99 academic year to $10.4 per instructional hour in
2002–03. Second, colleges receive more funding for students with higher resource needs. Students
receiving a disadvantage uplift are funded 7% higher on average than those that do not receive a
disadvantage uplift. ABE students are funded 30% more and average than non-ABE students. 22
Students receiving additional learning support receive nearly twice the funding on average as
compared to those that do not receive additional learning support. Funding per instructional hour
for ABE students receiving additional learning support (not shown) and disabled students receiving
additional learning support (not shown) is even higher. In conclusion, the per-pupil funding formula

20

Tuition remission was the ILR variable used to identify basic skills learners.

Details on the construction of the simulation can be found in the appendix of the full report
(Jaquette, 2005).
21

22 It may appear contradictory that funding for ABE students fell in 2002–03, the same year that the
Skills for Life initiative came into effect. The reason for this is as follows: the new funding formula which
came into effect in 2002–03 assigned a program weighting factor of 1.4 for ABE students. This weighting
factor was only applied to ABE qualifications that followed the new ABE national curriculum which came
into effect in 2002–03 (Department for Education and Skills, 2003b). However, colleges were considerably
confused about this policy and only a minority of ABE students were actually enrolled in qualifications that
met the new national curriculum (Learning & Skills Council, 2003).
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which emphasizes student success, allocates additional funding for students that need more
resources to become successful.
$20

Overall

$15

Receives additional learning
support
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Adult basic education student
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Figure 1. Funding per instructional hour, 1998–99 to 2002–03, using constant 2002 £ converted
using average 2002 exchange rate
Statistical Modeling
The preceding trends in success rates by subgroup are partially driven by their correlation
with particular variables. Modeling helps control for the effect of other variables. The analyses
presented below utilize logistic regression modeling. The model was built in stages, adding studentlevel socioeconomic determinants first, followed by qualification-level determinants, institution-level
determinants, and finally funding-determinants. Table 5 below shows selected variables from the
final model in which all variables were included. Due to space constraints, results of following
variables appear in Table A-2 (in the appendix): geographic region, area of learning, qualification
type, institution size, population density, and program weighting. The results for all models are
shown in the appendices of Jaquette (2005) which can be obtained by the author upon request.
Table 5 shows odds ratios and p-values for selected variables. The odds ratios show the odds
of success compared to that of the reference group, controlling for other factors. An odds ratio
greater than one means that group is more likely to be successful than the reference group, while an
odds ratio of less than one means that group is less likely to be successful than the reference group.
P-values are measures of statistical significance. With sample sizes so large, most effects are highly
significant. Therefore, the value of the odds ratio gives a better indication of whether one group has
significantly higher or lower success rates than another.
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Table 5
Odds Ratios for Student Success Logistic Regression
Variable
1998–99 1999–00
2000–01
2001–02
Deprivation index (ref= LT 10)
Deprivation 10-<20
0.96***
0.95***
0.94***
0.94***
Deprivation 20-<30
0.90***
0.88***
0.86***
0.88***
Deprivation 30-<50
0.82***
0.81***
0.78***
0.81***
Deprivation 50+
0.71***
0.73***
0.71***
0.75***
Female
1.25***
1.20***
1.20***
1.18***
Disabled
0.93***
0.98
0.93***
0.89***
Ethnicity (ref= white)
Asian-other
0.81***
0.82***
0.80***
0.81***
Bangladeshi
0.81***
0.75***
0.80***
0.83***
Black-African
0.74***
0.82***
0.76***
0.76***
Black-Caribbean
0.72***
0.76***
0.76***
0.76***
Black-other
0.71***
0.73***
0.75***
0.75***
Chinese
0.79***
0.79***
0.82***
0.83***
Indian
0.90***
0.90***
0.91***
0.95***
Pakistani
0.76***
0.74***
0.64***
0.77***
Age (ref= 19–25)
Age 26–34
1.17***
1.20***
1.25***
1.28***
Age 35–44
1.28***
1.32***
1.39***
1.44***
Age 45–54
1.17***
1.21***
1.30***
1.38***
Age 55+
0.93***
1.05***
1.13***
1.27***
Qualification levela (ref= level 1)
Level 2
1.09***
1.02***
0.96***
0.96***
Level 3
1.18***
1.20***
1.15***
1.09***
Level 4 & 5
1.07***
0.80***
0.75***
0.78***
Other Level
1.49***
1.48***
1.37***
0.92***
Externally assessed
0.82***
0.88***
0.92***
0.68***
Mode of Attendance (ref= full-time full-year)
Full-time Part-year
1.06***
1.14***
1.32***
1.47***
Part-time
0.82***
0.83***
0.99
1.06***
Qualification duration (ref= LT 24 weeks)
24-<48 Weeks
0.67***
0.71***
0.63***
0.56***
48+ Weeks
0.51***
0.47***
0.47***
0.38***
Open/Distance Education
0.64***
0.79***
0.65***
0.50***
Funding Determinants
Postcode disadvantage uplift
0.99
0.99
1.00
0.97***
Additional learning support
1.31***
1.26***
1.24***
1.43***
Access funding
1.00
0.98
Means tested benefit
0.69***
0.71***
0.75***
0.80***
ABE students
0.81***
0.91***
1.08***
1.08***
Asylum seeker
0.85***
0.71***
0.90***
0.82***
N
1,244,985 1,608,931 1,622,600 1,629,278
Pseudo R2
.09
.079
.084
.104
Number of Parameters
74
74
75
75

2002–03
0.94***
0.89***
0.82***
0.77***
1.21***
0.97***
0.77***
0.92***
0.74***
0.71***
0.69***
0.87***
1.00
0.81***
1.26***
1.44***
1.45***
1.43***
0.91***
1.00
0.86***
1.47***
0.70***
1.29***
0.96***
0.61***
0.47***
0.55***
0.98***
1.52***
1.13***
0.73***
1.16***
0.80***
1,771,656
.096
75
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Table 5 notes:
Results for geographic region, area of learning, qualification type, institution size, population density,
and program weighting not shown. See Table A-2 in appendix for full model.
a
Percentages for 2002–03 not comparable to previous years due to change in definitions for how
qualification level was defined.
b
The reference group for each funding determinant is qualifications not having that characteristic.
For example, the odds ratio for Additional Learning Support shows the regression adjusted odds of
success in comparison to qualifications that do not receive Additional Learning Support.
c
The access funding program did not begin until the 2000–01 academic year
* p<.01, ** p<.001, *** p<.0001
Regression models were run separately for each academic year. Therefore, year to year
comparisons should be made with caution. Recall that success rates increased by 10% over the five
year period. If the odds ratio for a particular subgroup remains the same from year to year, it does
not mean that the odds of success for that subgroup did not change from the previous year. Rather,
it means that compared to the reference group, the subgroup has the same likelihood of success
compared to the reference group as it did in the previous year. Comparing odds ratios over time for
a particular row can, however, show how success rates for that group changed over time compared
to the reference group. If a particular subgroup consistently had an odds ratio of .8, this means that
their odds of success are lower than the reference group but that their gains in success rates are
keeping pace with that of the reference group.
Regression results in Table 5 show findings similar to the descriptive statistics. First, for level
of deprivation, the odds ratios are all lower than one. This makes intuitive sense; it means that, after
controlling for other factors, success rates are higher for the lowest deprivation band, which is the
reference group. However, the odds ratios for the high deprivation groups get larger in each year,
meaning that, controlling for other variables, success rates for more deprived students are catching
up to success rates for less deprived students. The same can be said about ethnic minorities in
comparison to white students, which are the reference group; despite having lower success rates in
each year (exhibited by odds ratios less than one), odds ratios for ethnic minorities generally grow
higher each year.
There are several notable differences between the descriptive statistics and the regression
results. When the model is run without qualification level variables (not shown), the odds ratios for
high deprivation bands increase, which shows that these students are disproportionately enrolled in
low-level qualifications which have higher success rates for all students (Jaquette, 2005). This line of
thinking can be employed to explain the results for other sub-groups; Bangladeshis have higher odds
ratios than whites (reference group) when only socioeconomic variables such as deprivation are
included. This is because Bangladeshis are disproportionately living in high deprivation areas, a
characteristic correlated with low success rates. However, the odds ratios for Bangladeshis decline
once qualification level variables are added because Bangladeshis are disproportionately enrolled in
entry level qualifications which have high success rates for all students. Such analysis shows the
value of statistical modeling over descriptive statistics.
Moving to age, even after controlling for other variables, such as difficulty level and
qualification duration, older students have much higher success rates than younger ones.
Additionally, longer course duration and open/distance education are both associated with lower
success rates. As predicted in the analysis of funding policy, qualifications that were externally
assessed had lower rates of success than non-externally assessed qualifications. The strength of this
trend increased over time.
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Externally assessed qualifications much lower odds of success than externally non-externally
assessed qualifications. These findings support the statement that funding for achievement can lead
to a decline in academic standards. At the same time, this decline is not inevitable. External
assessment precludes this possibility.
This study is centrally concerned with funding determinants which are shown at the bottom
of Table 5. Here, results for the individual components of the funding formula are shown, because it
proved difficult to model the entire funding formula in any meaningful way. Institutions received
financial rewards (described above) for increasing the success rates of students on means tested
benefits, asylum seekers, and students receiving a postcode disadvantage uplift. Despite having odds
ratios less than one, success rates for these students kept pace with the strong gains of their
respective reference groups. 23
Success rates for ABE students increased over time, and were especially strong in 2002–03
with an odds ratio of 1.16. This means that ABE students made strong gains in comparison to nonABE students, who were the reference group. This is an important finding considering the number
of funding initiatives which have been aimed at ABE students. The positive results for ABE
students are stronger (1.24 odds ratio in 2002–03) when external assessment is not included in the
model (model not shown). This is because ABE students were disproportionately enrolled in nonexternally assessed qualifications.
The results for students receiving Additional Learning Support (ALS) are even stronger. ALS
has a large, positive impact on the odds of success, and this effect has grown over time. For example
in 2002–03 students receiving ALS were 1.52 times more likely to be successful than those not
receiving ALS. When external assessment is not included in the model, the odds ratio rises slightly to
1.55. The results for ABE students and ALS students are positive from a policy perspective. They
suggest that financial policies targeted at institutions can help increase student success rates.

Conclusion: Policy Learning for U.S. Community Colleges?
To summarize, overall success rates for the population analyzed rose by 10% over a five year
period. Gains were especially strong for ABE students, disadvantaged students, and those in need of
additional learning support. How was this achieved? This study has focused on the role of funding
policy and regulatory control. 1992 Incorporation Reform created a quasi-market in further
education. Utilizing the theoretical discussion of quasi-markets, government policy generally sought
to retain public providers, but created incentives for these providers to act competitively. These
colleges became responsible for their own financial solvency. Colleges were given performance
funding contracts. Institutions only receive funding if they are able to attract students. If their
students dropped out or were not successful, funding would decrease. Additionally, high or
improving success rates were prerequisite for “good inspection grades,” which in turn determined
the job security of a college’s senior management.
The quantitative analyses presented yield optimistic results. We are not powerless in the face
of socioeconomic factors. The unintended consequences of performance accountability are not
inevitable. External assessment can protect against declining academic standards. A disadvantage
In order to check for high collinearity between “level of deprivation” and students receiving a
“postcode disadvantage uplift,” an additional model (not shown) was run without “level of deprivation.” The
results for this model were very similar to the model shown.
23
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uplift can protect against the disincentive against enrolling students with higher resource needs.
Inspection can protect against the incentive to focus resources only on a small number of outcomes.
However, it would be difficult to incorporate these policies to U.S. states. Five reasons are
listed. First, all public funding for English further education comes from the central government,
while public funding for community colleges comes from federal, state and local governments. From
an organizational theory perspective, the more that organizations in a sector rely on a single funding
source, the more leverage that funding source has to demand performance (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Scott & Meyer, 1991). The relative dilution of public funding sources for community colleges
and the small amount of funding devoted to performance makes it unlikely that performance
funding will be sufficient to induce behavioral change in community colleges.
Second, a fundamental priority of any organization is survival (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
Voucher funding systems, which use the threat of market-exit as an inventive for increased
efficiency, inherently increase budget instability in comparison to traditional “base + enrollment
growth + inflation” funding policies. On Incorporation Day (April 1, 1993) there were 465 further
education colleges but by 2003 there were only 435 colleges due to mergers and closures (Cope,
Goodship, & Holloway, 2003). Such closures would not be tolerated in the U.S. because the
American Association of Community Colleges is much stronger than its English counterpart, The
Association of Colleges.
Third, although the equity components of the per-pupil funding formula would be
supported by champions of social justice the U.S. political climate that increasingly values merit
funding over need-based funding. Furthermore, need-based funding policies in the U.S. are usually
eroded over time by political pressure to cater to middle-class voters, as has been the case with
Federal Pell Grants (Callan, 2001) and the Georgia Hope Scholarship (Henry & Rubenstein, 2002).
Fourth, the English brand of performance funding could not be imported to the U.S.
because English qualifications are generally much shorter and more discrete than U.S. degrees.
Interestingly, the English system provides performance funding when students successfully pass
sub-components of a single qualification (Learning & Skills Council, 2002). By contrast, U.S.
performance funding entire degrees (which can take community college students upwards of six
years to complete) seems ridiculous. A U.S. performance funding system analogous to the English
system would provide performance funding for each individual course successfully completed, but
lack of external assessment would make such a policy problematic.
Fifth, the U.S. lacks the strong regulatory agencies that underpin the English system. Perhaps
the most intractable obstacle to importing English policies is the fundamental difference between
the U.S. and English welfare states. England regulates further education through a sophisticated
bureaucracy of state-owned regulatory agencies. The Department for Education and Skills controls
overall strategy and can continually reorganize the regulatory agencies under its remit so that their
individual missions balance the sector on the whole. Other areas of English social policy, such as
welfare and unemployment benefits, operate similarly (Cope et al., 2003).
The U.S., by contrast, has a much smaller welfare state, and historically relies on voluntary
agencies to regulate social policy. In his 19th century observations of America Alexis de Tocqueville
said “Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations….
Wherever at the head of some new undertaking you see the government in France, or a man of rank
in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an association” (Tocqueville, 1862, p. 198).
Accreditation of postsecondary education institutions provides an example of one such voluntary
agency. Accreditation is America’s substitute for English inspection and external assessment.
However, accreditation associations are run by college and university presidents. This violates the
English principle that regulation and provision should have an arms-length relationship. U.S.
accreditation associations cannot be expected to hold a tough line with regard to performance
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accountability standards, especially when public funding is at stake. In absence of strong state
regulatory agencies, performance funding for student success is likely to decrease academic
standards.
A frequent lesson from international comparative policy research is that individual social
policies work because they are buoyed by a complex welfare state and social structure that has
evolved over time in that particular country (Esping-Anderson, 1990). Wholesale policy borrowing
rarely works. However, certain components of English policymaking may be more feasible in some
states than others. Florida, for instance, has a strong regulatory environment and 69% of community
college operating revenue comes from the state (Education Commission of the States, 2000), a trait
that permits considerable leverage to demand performance.
Despite these heavy-handed caveats, the English story is a positive one that U.S.
policymakers can learn from. First, performance accountability based is merely a means to convince
colleges to focus their resources on outcomes deemed important by external stakeholders.
Performance accountability policies are typically unsuccessful when colleges are coerced into
compliance, or if they think the performance indicators or performance targets to be unreasonable.
Policy mandates cannot increase student success alone; before any dramatic gains in student success,
colleges must internalize the value of student success. My informal interviews with policymakers and
college presidents in England convinced me that English policy was successful in convincing
colleges to internalize the importance of student success.
In England the report Unfinished Business (Audit Commission & Office for Standards in
Education, 1993), which showed the low retention and success rates in further education colleges,
was instrumental in convincing college administrators and faculty that these problems needed urgent
repair. Furthermore, equity funding components, such as the disadvantage uplift and ALS funding,
show college administrators that the government is a reasonable partner and that it will provide the
additional resources to make student success a reality. By contrast, U.S. policies which demand
better student outcomes without additional funding that considers educational inputs have been
viewed with skepticism (Burke & Associates, 2002; Dougherty & Hong, 2005; Harbour & Nagy,
2005).
Although the English story is a positive one, a note of caution is necessary. Since the 2002–
03 academic year, the English government has increasingly coerced further education colleges to
serve national economic ends. England has a centralized, as opposed to federalized, system of
governance and the central government controls nearly all funding for further education colleges. In
2001 the Department of Education was merged with the Department of Employment to become
the Department for Education and Skills (DfES). The recent education policies of the DfES—for
example raising fees, cutting funding for adult education, and pressuring colleges to provide training
in certain industries (Department for Education and Skills, 2003)– are clearly economically
motivated and are resented by many colleges as an infringement on autonomy and a diminished
commitment to disadvantaged students. In the coming years the coalition between colleges and the
government may crumble. A more thorough discussion is outside a scope of this paper, but one
general insight emerges; although centralized education policy can make impressive progress, it can
also be hijacked by a narrow economic focus which can hurt the system in the long run. The
emerging story will be interesting to watch.
The final policy lesson from this research concerns the use of market-based policies—
specifically voucher systems—in education. Interestingly, voucher systems in education were first
theorized by American economist Milton Friedman (1955) and first implemented by U.S. school
districts (Halsey, Lauder, Phillip, & Stuart Wells, 1997). English further education colleges are
funded through a national voucher system in which funding follows students to whatever institution
they decide to attend. Similar voucher systems are used to fund English compulsory education
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(Glennerster, 2002), and compulsory education in Belgium (Vandenberghe, 1998), and Sweden
(Lundahl, 2002).
Despite their widespread use in other countries, voucher systems have not taken root in U.S.
education, and the voucher debate remains polemical. Some critics contend that voucher systems
will only exacerbate social stratification (Newman, Couturier, & Scurry, 2004). Indeed, this can be
true. For example, the new voucher system for higher education in Colorado pays a flat rate to all
residents, which wealthy families may use to supplement their existing income (Harbour et al., 2006).
Clearly, voucher systems pose legitimate questions of concern. Will for-profit institutions be
eligible for voucher funding? Will religious institutions be eligible for voucher funding, thereby
diluting the separation between church and state? What about the stratification of educational
achievement? School choice tends to create a sorting hat where the best students—typically having
the most informed and engaged parents—are concentrated in the same schools while the worst
students are concentrated in others (Vandenberghe, 1998). Indeed, this has been a problem in
English compulsory education (Ball et al., 2000). However, does this problem persist in adult
education, where there are often few affordable providers within a reasonable geographic distance?
On the other hand, voucher systems can tailor funding to individualized student needs in a
way that block funding cannot. Depending on the particular funding formula used, voucher systems
can exacerbate educational inequalities or they can promote educational equality. The English
voucher system promotes vertical equity. It pays tuition for disadvantaged students and, as Figure 1
showed, colleges receive more funding for enrolling students that require additional resources to be
successful.
In conclusion, this research calls for a more nuanced discussion of voucher systems in
education. Voucher systems are policy tools that give institutions incentives to achieve outcomes
that are rewarded by the funding formula. They are neither inherently good nor inherently bad; the
policy details matter a great deal.
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Appendix
Table A-1
Sample Size: Qualifications by Year and Subgroup
Variable
Overall
Deprivation Index
Deprivation LT 10
Deprivation 10-<20
Deprivation 20-<30
Deprivation 35-<50
Deprivation 50+
Ethnicity
Bangladeshi
Black-African
Black-Caribbean
Black-Other
Chinese
Indian
Pakistani
White
Asian-Other
Gender
Male
Female
Age
Age 19–25
Age 26–34
Age 35–44
Age 45–54
Age 55+
Disabled
Qualification levela
Entry & level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4 or Higher
Other
External assessment
Not externally assessed
Externally assessed
Qualification duration
LT 24 Weeks
24-<48 Weeks
48+ Weeks

1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03
1,509,393 1,687,464 1,692,394 1,646,138 1,771,842
329,810
436,658
278,732
322,034
142,159

365,731
483,795
309,921
362,924
165,093

365,396
480,302
307,696
366,418
172,582

369,394
470,287
295,890
349,254
161,313

371,588
491,029
317,918
396,008
195,299

7,755
9,114
10,295
11,604
15,677
33,780
38,409
45,118
49,322
64,450
30,092
33,403
31,710
34,666
41,738
11,243
12,882
13,599
10,587
11,632
8,899
10,437
9,944
9,665
12,785
29,268
37,855
35,799
35,916
43,477
31,013
33,540
35,455
34,505
40,668
1,177,380 1,260,058 1,210,861 1,129,889 1,311,190
17,681
23,764
29,420
30,670
36,637
569,048
631,287
636,922
626,456
673,948
940,345 1,056,177 1,055,472 1,019,682 1,097,894
363,485
426,861
378,978
221,082
118,987
83,927

390,459
454,255
424,700
255,302
162,748
108,009

388,885
434,282
421,507
257,197
190,523
139,531

367,617
394,028
403,925
256,781
223,787
157,727

412,494
418,390
426,266
261,555
253,137
204,372

439,825
372,908
272,344
51,581
372,735

621,675
476,299
322,010
36,115
231,365

624,377
448,887
318,419
31,324
269,387

619,177
431,416
293,362
25,233
276,950

858,984
434,292
294,696
34,092
149,778

331,466
164,134
199,966
293,008
448,577
1,177,927 1,523,330 1,492,428 1,353,130 1,323,265
494,352
830,882
184,159

603,543
875,065
208,856

641,736
861,214
189,444

659,468
818,652
168,018

748,634
844,314
178,894
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Variable

1998–99

1999–00

2000–01

2001–02

2002–03

Mode of attendance
Full-time, full-year
302,482
323,105
312,304
285,149
319,136
Full-time, part-year
82,854
98,716
111,348
118,090
114,797
Part-time
1,124,057 1,265,643 1,268,742 1,242,899 1,337,909
Open/distance learning
83,674
61,012
78,916
123,820
127,065
Funding Determinants
Receive access fundingb
70,526
74,232
149,949
Postcode disadvantage uplift
440,432
454,575
451,883
429,449
516,141
On benefit
254,439
276,424
253,293
226,068
271,579
ABE student
119,546
149,385
155,942
160,031
243,046
Asylum seeker
5,438
14,197
24,311
27,710
35,323
Additional Learning Support
81,054
105,700
133,967
127,717
164,280
a
Qualification level in 2002–03 not comparable to previous years due to change in definitions for
how qualification level was defined.
b
The access funding program did not begin until the 2000–01 academic year
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Table A-2
Full-Model Regression Results
Variable
Socioeconomic determinants
Deprivation (ref = LT 10)
Deprivation 10-<20
Deprivation 20-<30
Deprivation 30-<50
Deprivation 50+
Female
Disabled
Ethnicity (ref= white)
Asian-other
Bangladeshi
Black-African
Black-Caribbean
Black-other
Chinese
Indian
Pakistani
Age (ref= 19–25)
Age 26–34
Age 35–44
Age 45–54
Age 55+
Region (ref= South East)
East Anglia
East Midlands
Greater London
North East
North West
South West
West Midlands
Yorkshire Humberside
Qualification determinants
Qualification levela
(ref = level 1)
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4 & 5
Other level
Externally assessed

1998–99

1999–00

2000–01

2001–02

2002–03

0.96***
0.90***
0.82***
0.71***
1.25***
0.93***

0.95***
0.88***
0.81***
0.73***
1.20***
0.98

0.94***
0.86***
0.78***
0.71***
1.20***
0.93***

0.94***
0.88***
0.81***
0.75***
1.18***
0.89***

0.94***
0.89***
0.82***
0.77***
1.21***
0.97***

0.81***
0.81***
0.74***
0.72***
0.71***
0.79***
0.90***
0.76***

0.82***
0.75***
0.82***
0.76***
0.73***
0.79***
0.90***
0.74***

0.80***
0.80***
0.76***
0.76***
0.75***
0.82***
0.91***
0.64***

0.81***
0.83***
0.76***
0.76***
0.75***
0.83***
0.95***
0.77***

0.77***
0.92***
0.74***
0.71***
0.69***
0.87***
1.00
0.81***

1.17***
1.28***
1.17***
0.93***

1.20***
1.32***
1.21***
1.05***

1.25***
1.39***
1.30***
1.13***

1.28***
1.44***
1.38***
1.27***

1.26***
1.44***
1.45***
1.43***

1.00
1.17***
0.86***
1.21***
1.02
1.23***
1.12***
1.14***

1.05***
1.27***
0.94***
1.35***
1.24***
1.18***
1.24***
1.20***

1.10***
1.12***
1.07***
1.57***
1.38***
1.19***
1.25***
1.26***

0.90***
1.09***
0.91***
1.22***
1.28***
1.09***
1.11***
1.06***

0.93***
1.07***
1.01
1.10***
1.16***
1.05***
1.03***
1.04***

1.09***
1.18***
1.07***
1.49***
0.82***

1.02***
1.20***
0.80***
1.48***
0.88***

0.96***
1.15***
0.75***
1.37***
0.92***

0.96***
1.09***
0.78***
0.92***
0.68***

0.91***
1.00
0.86***
1.47***
0.70***
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Variable
Area of learning
(ref= tourism/hospitality)
ABE
Agriculture
Art & design
Business
Construction
Engineering
Health & care
Humanities
Science, math, IT
Qualification type (ref= “other”)
A/AS
GNVQ
HE access
NVQ
pre GNVQ
Student mode of attendance
(ref= full-time full-year)
Full-time part-year
Part-time
Qualification duration
(ref= LT 24 weeks)
24-<48 weeks
48+ weeks
Open/distance education
Dedicated employer provision
Employee release
Qual is not highest level taken
Institution level determinants
College size (ref= LT 15,000)
15,000–25,000 students
8,000–15,000 students
GT 25,000 students
Population density (ref= urban)
Rural
Town
Tertiary college (ref= general further
education college)
Funding determinantsb
Postcode disadvantage uplift
Additional learning support
Access fundingc
Means tested benefit
Basic skills learner
Asylum seeker

1998–99

1999–00

2000–01

2001–02

2002–03

0.82***
0.72***
0.68***
0.75***
1.05*
0.96*
1.21***
0.66***
0.68***

0.77***
0.81***
0.65***
0.73***
0.98
0.81***
1.06***
0.60***
0.60***

0.97
0.64***
0.73***
0.92***
1.01
0.95**
1.16***
0.65***
0.66***

0.90***
0.68***
0.77***
0.71***
0.91***
1.04
1.07***
0.55***
0.54***

0.71***
0.69***
0.79***
0.84***
0.79***
0.93***
1.14***
0.58***
0.61***

0.62***
0.84***
1.04
0.74***
1.11***

0.55***
0.94*
0.83***
0.67***
1.02***

0.67***
0.81***
0.89***
0.61***
0.88***

0.77***
0.79***
0.92***
0.64***
0.82***

0.82***
0.93*
0.90***
0.69***
1.12***

1.06***
0.82***

1.14***
0.83***

1.32***
0.99

1.47***
1.06***

1.29***
0.96***

0.67***
0.51***
0.64***
0.89***
1.28***
1.20***

0.71***
0.47***
0.79***
1.13***
1.19***
1.23***

0.63***
0.47***
0.65***
1.50***
1.30***
1.17***

0.56***
0.38***
0.50***
1.41***
1.38***
1.14***

0.61***
0.47***
0.55***
1.88***
1.48***
1.00

1.02*
0.99
0.82***

0.94***
0.99
0.96***

0.96***
0.97***
0.94***

0.96***
0.95***
0.83***

0.89***
0.90***
0.89***

0.98
0.99
1.06***

1.00
0.98*
0.97***

1.03***
1.01
0.96***

1.06***
1.06***
0.90***

1.06***
1.03***
0.99

0.99
1.31***

0.99
1.26***

0.69***
0.81***
0.85***

0.71***
0.91***
0.71***

1.00
1.24***
1.00
0.75***
1.08***
0.90***

0.97***
1.43***
0.98
0.80***
1.08***
0.82***

0.98***
1.52***
1.13***
0.73***
1.16***
0.80***
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Variable
1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03
Program weighting factor
(ref = A = 1.00)
B=1.12
1.06***
1.04***
1.15***
1.07***
1.00
C=1.3
0.94***
1.05***
1.21***
1.05***
1.17***
D=1.6
0.85***
0.90***
1.19***
0.86***
1.10***
E=1.72
0.95
0.88*
1.47***
1.21***
1.10*
F=1.4
0.70***
0.78***
0.65***
0.69***
0.87***
Model Fit Statistics
Number of cases
1,244,985 1,608,931 1,622,600 1,629,278 1,771,656
Raw student success rate
56.4%
59.6%
61.8%
64.2%
66.9%
-2 log L
1,619,075 2,073,899 2,055,472 1,997,139 2,121,875
Pseudo r-square
0.09
0.079
0.084
0.104
0.096
Chi-square
86,148
96,399
103,144
128,778
126,941
Degrees of freedom
74
74
75
75
75
a
Percentages for 2002–03 not comparable to previous years due to change in definitions for how
qualification level was defined.
b
The reference group for each funding determinant is qualifications not having that characteristic.
For example, the odds ratio for Additional Learning Support shows the regression adjusted odds of
success in comparison to qualifications that do not receive Additional Learning Support.
c
The access funding program did not begin until the 2000–01 academic year
* p<.01, ** p<.001, *** p<.0001
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